...и как Саакашвили оказался прав.
Телеграмма посла США во Франции Стаплтона от 13 июня 2007 г.
June 13, 2007, 11:00 A.M.
Некоторые выдержки:
4. Burns noted at the outset President Bush's strong stance on Kosovo, in private and in public, during his recent visit to Pristina and Sofia. Burns said the President had made clear to President Putin at the G8 Summit that Kosovo would become independent. Russia could perhaps delay this outcome, but it could not stop it... Burns termed the Russian threat to recognize Abkhazia in retaliation for Western recognition of Kosovo hollow, given that other members of the international community would not follow (with the possible exception of Belarus; Saakashvili suggested that only Venezuela would support Russia).
5. Continuing that Putin had a highly personal interest in Abkhazia, Saakashvili claimed that Putin had recalled Russian diplomats in Georgia to prepare documents on Abkhazia.
6. He [Saakashvili] worried that Russia would use any negotiations on an amended UNSCR to insert language that could later be cited as justification for its actions on Abkhazia. Burns reiterated the U.S. position that the record of UN involvement in Kosovo put it exactly opposite from the situation in Abkhazia.
7. Saakashvili asserted that Putin had promised him to veto Kosovo independence. Burns responded that Putin had stopped short of using the word "veto" in his discussions with the President.
8. Saakashvili asked how the USG and others would respond to possible Russian parallel demands for an international presence aimed at postponing until some point in the future a decision on independence for Abkhazia. He urged Burns to reject such arguments out of hand, given that the Russians were responsible for the war in Abkhazia and that this was a merely a stratagem to re-absorb their lost empire piece by piece. They had recovered Chechnya and would like to recover Georgia; failing success on the latter, they would take Abkhazia.
9. Wisner responded that breaking off Abkhazia would call into question the consensual break-up of the former Soviet Union… Saakashvili responded that the Abkhaz were refusing contact with the GOG, were fully under the control of the Russian FSB, and were already effectively isolated… He noted ominously that Putin had once spoken of a possible negotiated solution to Abkhazia, but no longer mentioned it as a possibility.
10. Saakashvili asserted that Putin had originally bet on regime change in Georgia, but that this had failed. His current plan was therefore to use Abkhazia to destroy Georgia... the Russians had given up playing the South Ossetia card against Georgia. Putin had told him that he did not care about South Ossetia, so long as Georgia avoided bloodshed and solved the problem quietly.
11. Commenting that Putin viewed the U.S. as his main competitor and surmising that Putin wanted his legacy to be one of toughness, Saakashvili said only blunt language from the U.S. could force Putin to modify his "reckless" behavior and realize what was at stake for Russia... With respect to NATO, Saakashvili stressed that Georgia viewed the conclusion of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) as less a promise for early membership than a key deterrent against Russian adventurism.
12. Burns noted that… if Kosovo could be put to bed in the early fall, then the December NATO ministerial… might be used to push forward on MAP… Although the U.S. approach viewed the process strategically, the Germans and French were hesitant and afraid to irk Russia.
13. Saakashvili worried that if a decision were postponed until the Bucharest Summit, Allies might be reluctant to displease the recently elected new Russian president… He noted ominously that the Russians mentioned Cyprus a lot, suggesting the possibility of a military adventure.
14. Burns reiterated the importance of reform in persuading European Allies to support MAP for Georgia… [Saakashvili] predicted that the Europeans would then seek some new excuse to deny Georgia its due.
15. Putin was emotionally attached to Sochi and viewed Abkhazia's location as strategic; it had a deep sea port and 900 million barrels of oil on shore, with untold quantities potentially available offshore. The only thing still holding Putin back from recognizing Abkhazia was his fear of the United States, not the Europeans. The USG needed to be tough with Putin, and would need to neutralize European accommodationist tendencies vis-a-vis Russia.
16. Saakashvili assured him that Georgia knew how to be patient, citing the quiet Georgian reaction to a recent unidentified attack on Georgian territory most likely perpetrated by Russian forces… he assured Burns that Georgia's preference was for reformers rather than generals, and that even the Russians were fascinated by the pace and breadth of Georgian reforms. Unfortunately, the Russian goal was to kill reforms -- for themselves and others.
17. [Saakashvili] expressed concern that the USG was underestimating the importance of the Black Sea… Saakashvili commented that the Turks in particular had wanted to keep NATO out and preserve their own influence, and opined that a greater Western political and military presence in the Black Sea region would deter Russia and bolster Georgia and Ukraine. By contrast, a Turkish incursion into Iraq would only encourage the Russians to follow that example.
STAPLETON
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/113393
