Андрей Илларионов (aillarionov) wrote,
Андрей Илларионов
aillarionov

Как Альенде уничтожал чилийскую демократию

Дайджест текста на русском языке от sergiy06:

22 августа 1973 г. двумя третями депутатов Парламента Чили принято постановление, обвиняющее Президента Чили Альенде в нарушениях Конституции Чили.
Эти нарушения включают в себя:
- поддержку со стороны Альенде вооружённых групп;
- незаконные аресты граждан Чили;
- пытки в отношении граждан Чили;
- установление цензуры прессы;
- манипулирование дезинформацией в области школьного и студенческого образования;
- закрытие границ в Чили с установлением запрета гражданам свободно покидать Чили и возвращаться в нее;
- конфискация частной собственности в Чили;
- создание преступных организаций в Чили;
- узурпация судебной власти президентом Альенде;
- посягательство президента Альенде на независимость (от власти президента) депутатов Парламента Чили;
- подчинение лично президенту Альенде решений министерства финансов Чили.

Данное постановление Парламента Чили установило, что такие деяния совершались президентом Альенде на систематической основе и вели к установлению в Чили тоталитарной политической системы.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ещё на своём съезде в июле 1965 г. в Линаресе Социалистическая партия Чили, объявившая себя марксистско-ленинской, постановила, что участие в демократических выборах в Чили является для партии способом захвата всей власти в стране.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
В марте 1953 г., через неделю после смерти Иосифа Сталина, представитель социалистической партии Чили Альенде был одним из выступавших на торжественной церемонии в память советского тоталитарного диктатора.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
В интервью испанской газете ABC от 10 октября 1973, Фрей подытожил: «Страна в результате правления Альенде не имеет иного выхода, кроме создания военного правительства»«Мир не знает, что чилийские марксисты имеют в своем распоряжении оружия гораздо больше по количеству и качеству, чем у чилийской армии», «Вооруженные силы были призваны покончить с произволом, и они соблюдают правовые обязательства, потому что исполнительная и судебная власть, Парламент и Верховный суд  все публично осудили президента Альенде и его режим в действиях по уничтожению Конституции», «Гражданская война в Чили была подготовлена марксистами», «Меня тревожит, что в Европе никто не понимает реальности Альенде задумал уничтожить наш чилийский народ».

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Jose Pinera. How political violence destroyed democracy in Chile

At noon on Wednesday, August 22, 1973, the Chilean Chamber of Deputies was convened to consider a Resolution that would change the course of Chile's history…

The Resolution, approved by almost two-thirds of the members (63.3 percent), accused President Allende's administration of 20 concrete violations of the Constitution and national laws. These violations included: support of armed groups, illegal arrests, torture, muzzling the press, manipulating education, not allowing people to leave the country, confiscating private property, forming seditious organizations, and usurping powers belonging to the Judiciary, Congress, and the Treasury. The Resolution held that such acts were committed in a systematic manner, with the aim of installing in Chile "a totalitarian system"…

The Resolution of the Chamber of Deputies has 15 Articles and can be broken down conceptually into the following four concepts:

a) a Preamble contained in Articles 1 through 4, which describe the known conditions essential for the existence of the Rule of Law. It contains a warning charged with significance: "a government that assumes powers not granted to it by the people engages in sedition." It also contains a reminder that President Allende was not elected by a majority of the popular vote, but by the Congress, "subject to a statute of democratic guarantees incorporated into the Constitution."

b) twenty Accusations of violations of the Constitution and the laws: one general accusation (Articles 5 and 6); seven accusations of violations of the separation of powers (Articles, 7, 8 and 9); ten accusations of actual violations of specified human rights (Article 10); and, finally, two accusations of seditious acts (Articles 11 and 12). This listing has a structure similar to the chain of accusations against King George III made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America.

c) a Clarification regarding the role of the military ministers that President Allende had nominated to key cabinet posts (Articles 13 and 14). It should be pointed out that a year earlier Allende himself opened the doors of politics to the military by placing various generals and admirals in key ministries. For several months, he had even appointed Army Commander-in-Chief Carlos Prats to the Ministry of the Interior, a highly controversial and important political office. In August 1973, an admiral was made Minister of Finance, an office that was key to the economic management of the country.

d) a Plea to the military ministers (Article 15), who were also the commanders-in-chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force, to put "an immediate end" to these serious constitutional violations.

On August 23 a messenger from the Chamber of Deputies brought an envelope to “La Moneda”, the traditional presidential palace. Addressed to the President, it contained the text of the Resolution approved the night before. The next day, President Allende released a letter directed to the nation stating: "To ask that the Armed Forces and National Police carry out key functions of the government, without the authority and political direction of the President of the Republic, is to ask for a coup d'etat." Allende understood well point d) of the Resolution…

…the opposition to President Allende won an absolute majority in the parliamentary elections of March 1973, winning almost two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies. But the opposition had no such majority in the Senate. In effect, the Constitution of 1925 allowed an administration to violate it-even systematically, as a wide majority of deputies maintained-as long as that administration maintained a third of the senators in its corner.

It is revealing to note the confusion about the meaning of "Rule of Law" reflected in Allende's response, since he declared that he would insist upon his illegal route since, "by means of the expression 'Rule of Law' is hidden a situation of economic and social injustice among Chileans that our people have rejected. They are trying to ignore that the Rule of Law can only fully exist in such measure as we can overcome the inequalities of a capitalist society."

That declaration was consistent with the one made by his Minister of Justice on July 1, 1972: "The revolution will remain within the law as long as the law does not try to stop the revolution."…

Already in its Congress of Linares (July 1965), the Socialist Party of Chile, which defined itself as Marxist-Leninist, had maintained the following: "Our strategy in fact rejects the electoral route as a way to achieve our goal of seizing power... The party has one objective: in order to obtain power, the party must use all the methods and means that the revolutionary struggle requires."

But it was in its Congress of Chillán (November 1967) that the seditious posture reached its highest expression. There were 115 delegates attending, as well as "brother delegates" from the Communist governments of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Romania and Yugoslavia, and from the Baath Socialist Party of Syria and the Socialist Party of Uruguay. The resolution adopted stated that, "revolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate... It constitutes the only route to political and economic power, and its only defense and strength. Only by destroying the democratic-military apparatus of the bourgeois State can the socialist revolution take root... The peaceful and legal expressions of struggle do not, in themselves, lead to power. The Socialist Party considers them to be instruments of limited action, part of a political process that leads us to armed struggle. The politics of the workers' front is carried on and is contained within the policy of the Latin American Organization of Solidarity (OLAS), which reflects the new, continent-wide armed dimension of the Latin American process of revolution" (Julio César Jobet, History of the Socialist Party of Chile, 1997).

Socialist Party ideologue Clodomiro Almeyda, who would be Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Allende, speculated about the manner in which that process would end: "It is impossible to say in absolute terms what fundamental form the final phase of political struggle will assume in a country like Chile, when the current process gives way and the order of the day is the problem of power. I am inclined to believe that it will most probably take the form of a revolutionary civil war, Spanish-style, with foreign intervention, but much more rapidly and decisively"(Revista Punto Final, November 22, 1967).

It should be pointed out that the Socialist Party was the second-largest party in the country, that it would be the principal party in the UP coalition that governed Chile from 1970 to 1973, and that Salvador Allende was its most noteworthy militant. Its allied party, the Communist Party of Chile, was the largest and best-organized of all the communist parties in Latin America, and the third largest in the Western world, after those of France and Italy…

In March of 1953, a week after the death of Joseph Stalin, Socialist Salvador Allende was one of the principal speakers at a ceremony in honor of the Soviet dictator. It is illustrative to recall the incredible homage to Stalin made by a key Chilean communist leader, Volodia Teitelboim: "Today the eternal glory of Comrade Joseph Stalin sleeps in the radiant chamber of the Hall of Columns in Moscow. It has scarcely been one day and a few hours since the beloved leader of the world's workers passed away - the greatest, most profound, and most noble friend of humanity... The father and leader of all progressive mankind has died. As Mayakovsky said of Lenin, he was the most human of all men... He gave abundance and a existence to his people. Beneath the eternal flag of mourning for Stalin, the nations of the earth march down the shortest road to sure victory, toward the world of human happiness" (El Siglo, March 1953).

During the decade of the 1960s, Allende agreed to serve as president of the Latin American Organization of Solidarity, a pro-Castro organization designed to export Communist revolution to the continent, The organisation had publicly declared that "armed revolution is the only solution for the social and economic ills of Latin America."

Claudio Véliz, a historian and personal friend of Allende, maintained that Allende's trips to Cuba had "a fundamental impact on his plans for Chile. After seeing Cuba, Allende thought that he could take a short cut. But the truth is that he went against Chilean tradition... There is no doubt that the UP government was a disaster and one which led us into civil war" (El Mercurio, November 28, 1999).

As president of the Senate in the 1960s, Allende on various occasions expressed his support for the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), the group that initiated guerrilla violence in Chile. Of course, violence had been idealized for a long time by the Leftist leaders of Chile and the rest of the continent…

In this context, it is shocking to read the honest confession of a former Argentine guerrilla: "Today I can tell you how lucky we are that we were not victorious. Given our formation and our heavy dependence on Cuba, we would have sunk the continent in general barbarism. One of our watchwords was to turn the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of Latin America. First we would have shot the soldiers, then the opposition, and then any of our comrades who opposed our authoritarianism" (Jorge Masetti, El Furor y el Delirio, 1999).

Allende's response to the Resolution was not the only one in which he showed his confusion about the meaning of the Rule of Law in a democracy. The Allende administration had developed a most unusual juridical theory of "legal loopholes," by means of which it had embarked upon the nationalization of a large number of private businesses of all sizes. In 1973 the Supreme Court reproached him for assuming powers belonging to that body, which resulted in an acrimonious exchange of letters. Thus, on May 26, 1973, in protesting at the administration’s refusal to comply with a judicial decision, the Supreme Court addressed the President in a unanimous decision: "This Supreme Court is obliged to express to Your Excellency, once again, the illicit attitude of the administrative authority in its illegal interference in judicial matters, such as putting obstacles in the way of police compliance with court orders in criminal cases; orders which, under the existing law of the country, should be carried out by the police without obstacles of any kind. All of this implies an open and willful disregard for judicial verdicts, with complete ignorance of the confusion produced in the legal order by such attitudes and omissions; as the court expressed to Your Excellency in a previous dispatch, these attitudes also imply not just a crisis in the rule of law, but also the imminent rupture of legality in the Nation."

Allende, in a public speech a few days later, responded in this way: "In a time of revolution, political power has the right to decide, at the end of the day, whether or not judicial decisions correspond with the higher goals and historical necessities of social transformation, which should take absolute precedence over any other consideration; consequently, the Executive has the right to decide whether or not to carry out the verdicts of the Judicial Branch."

At this point, it is important to make clear that although the growing economic crisis was producing general misery and malaise-annualized inflation above 300 percent, rationing, a balance-of-payments crisis, growing unemployment, hopelessness-and although the crisis created an amplifying effect for these institutional conflicts, that was not the argument used for removing the Administration.

The trigger was provided by the fact that the country had becomed "an armed camp" and Chile was slouching towards a civil war. (An important book that confirm this reality is that of James Whelan, Out from the Ashes.)

Oscar Waiss, director of the government gazette (the "Diario Oficial") and an intimate friend of Allende, reflects in this statement the level of extremism reached by some of the UP leaders during the winter of 1973: "The moment had come to throw away all legalistic fetishism, to sack the military conspirators, to remove the Comptroller General, to intervene the Supreme Court and the Judiciary, to confiscate the El Mercurio newspaper and the whole pack of counterrevolutionary journalistic hounds. We must hit first, since he who hits first hits twice." ("Internacional Politics," No. 600, Belgrade, April 1975)…

The Frei administration took the country a long way in that direction, committing two other serious errors of public policy. In the first place, the administration responded weakly to the rise of political violence, and it was especially unfortunate that it did not react vigorously to defend democracy and the rule of law when the Socialist Party declared itself to be a partisan of armed struggle in its Congress of Chillán in 1967. And secondly, the administration's Agrarian Reform multiplied violations of property rights by expropriating thousands of agricultural properties without paying fair compensation. Furthermore, the Frei administration allowed the proliferation of de facto expropriations ("tomas") of other people's properties by groups of agitators. Such "tomas" under the Frei government included universities, municipalities, hundreds of agricultural properties, real estate, highways, industries, a military barracks, and even the Cathedral of Santiago. In this climate, it was not surprising that some parties on the Left sensed that taking total power was also feasible.

With the failure of Alessandri's "right-wing" administration, and the failure of Frei's "centrist" one, and in the absence of a democratic left, the result was predictable. In August of 1965, Frei himself had said, "If my administration fails, we will have a government of the extreme left." (Leonard Gross, The Last, Best Hope, 1967)…

It should be noted that he lived under the weight of the very heavy accusation that was made against him at the end of the 1960s, namely, that if he turned the government over to Allende, he would go down in history as the "Chilean Kerensky."

Frei chose to remain in Chile after stepping down. By remaining he put his life in great danger, a fact made clear when Leftist terrorists assassinated his ex minister and political heir, Edmundo Pérez Zujovic…

it was the posture assumed by Eduardo Frei, with rare strength, that tipped the balance among the military commanders in those crucial months of 1973. As President of the Senate, he was the leader with the greatest ability to call the opposition together, and he was also the Chilean leader with the most international prestige. Indeed, the London Times judged him to be “the most important political personality in Latin America."

Testimony exists showing that Frei had arrived at the conviction that only the Armed Forces could keep Chile from becoming a second Cuba. The highly significant “Rivera Memorandum” describes a meeting on July 6, 1973 between Frei and the leadership of the Chilean Industrialists Association (Sofofa), the largest trade association of Chilean manufacturers.

In that meeting, Sofofa’s leaders stated that “the country was disintegrating and that if urgent measures were not taken, Chile would fall under a bloody Cuban-style Marxist dictatorship.”

The response of Eduardo Frei is revealing: "There is nothing that can be done by myself, by the Congress, or by any civilian. Unfortunately, this problem can only be solved with guns... I fully share your apprehensions, and I advise you to express them plainly to the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces, hopefully today."

Frei’s most extensive testimony on these matters is his letter of November 8, 1973 to the President of the International Christian Democrat Party, the Italian politician Mariano Rumor. There Frei reiterated the accusations of the Resolution of the Chamber of Deputies: "They were implacable in their efforts to impose a social model clearly inspired in Marxism-Leninism. In order to achieve their ends they twisted the laws or openly trampled over them, ignoring the Judicial Branch. In their attempt at domination, they even tried to substitute a Popular Assembly in the place of the Congress as well as trying to create a system of Popular Tribunals, some of which actually began to operate. This was denounced publicly. They also attempted to transform the entire educational system, based on a process of Marxist indoctrination. These attempts were vigorously rejected, not only by the democratic political parties, but by unions and organizations of every kind, and with regard to education that meant the protests of the Catholic Church and of all of the Protestant faiths, who all made their opposition public. Faced with these realities the Christian Democrat Party could not remain silent. It was its duty—which it fulfilled—to denounce a totalitarian plot which was always disguised behind a democratic mask in order to buy time and to cover up its true objectives."

In a conversation with a journalist from the Spanish newspaper ABC, published October 10, 1973, Frei had already made severe judgements against the UP and had fully justified the military intervention: "The country has no way out other than a military government”; "The world does not know that Chilean Marxism had at its disposal arms superior in number and quality to that of the Chilean Army "; "The Armed Forces were called, and they complied with a legal obligation, because the executive and judiciary, the Congress and the Supreme Court, had all publicly denounced the presidency and its regime for destroying the Constitution"; "Civil War had been prepared by the Marxists "; "It is alarming that in Europe no one understands the reality: Allende left this nation destroyed."
http://www.josepinera.com/articles/articles_neveragain.htm

Tags: Чили, демократия, коммунизм, насилие
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